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Context A random variable X takes values in a finite possibility spaceX .
An agent has beliefs about X . Such beliefs are commonly expressed using
(probability) mass functions. However, such mass functions may not be
expressive enough.
Motivating example We flip a coin with identical sides of unknown type:
either twice heads or twice tails.
?
X = {H,T}
H T
p(H) = p(T) = 1/2 ?H Tp(H) = 1, p(T) = 0 ?H Tp(H) = 0, p(T) = 1
There is no mass function that expresses this ele-
mentary belief. What we want is a more expressive
model that can represent the stated belief, being
an OR statement. This belief model should resem-
ble the situation depicted on the right.
XH T
1. Introduction
Gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function
onX . We collect all gambles in L (X ). f is interpreted as
an uncertain reward : if the outcome of X turns out to be x,
then the agent receives the possibly negative reward f (x).
Sets of desirable gambles The agent gives his assess-
ment by specifying which gambles he strictly prefers to
zero—or assesses to be desirable:
D = { f ∈L (X ) : 0≺ f} for some strict partial order ≺.
Assessment An assessment A is a statement of desir-
ability of some gambles.
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There are four rationality requirements.
Avoiding partial loss Some gambles are excluded from
being desirable.
X = {H,T} T
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If f ≤ 0, then f /∈ D
Accepting partial gain Some gambles are always desir-
able.
X = {H,T} T
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If f > 0, then f ∈D
Scale invariance It should not matter in which utility scale
the gambles are expressed.
X = {H,T} T
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If f ∈D and λ ∈R>0, then λ f ∈D
Combination Given two desirable gambles, their sum is
also desirable.
X = {H,T} T
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If f ,g ∈D , then f + g ∈D
“Not more informative than” relation Given two sets of
desirable gambles D1 and D2,
D1 is not more informative than D2⇔D1 ⊆D2.
Given a collection D= {D1,D2, . . .} of coherent sets of desir-
able gambles, its infimum with respect to the partial order ⊆
infD=
⋂
D is a coherent set of desirable gambles.
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Coin example We want to use coherent sets of desirable
gambles to express the belief that the coin has two identical
sides.
T
H
DH = { f : f (H) > 0 or f > 0}
DH
T
H
DT = { f : f (T) > 0 or f > 0}
DT
T
H
Dv := DH∩DT
Dv = { f : f > 0}
The language of sets of desirable gam-
bles is not powerful enough to distinguish
between what we want to represent and
the vacuous—or minimal informative—
belief model Dv: every mass function is
possible.
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H T
2. Sets of desirable gambles
Because the “sets of desirable gambles” approach fails in
the coin example, we need more than binary comparisons
of gambles. We collect all the finite non-empty sets of gam-
bles in Q.
Choice functions A choice function C is a map
C : Q→Q∪{ /0} : O 7→C(O) such that C(O) ⊆ O.
The idea is that C selects the set C(O) of “best” gambles in
the option set O. This allows for more than binary compari-
son between gambles. We define the rejection function R
as
R(O) := O\C(O) for all O in Q.
There are seven rationality requirements.
a b c d e f
X = {a,b,c,d,e, f}
= 23 +
1
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Non-emptiness The choice should never be empty.
C({ , , , }) 6= /0 C(O) 6= /0 for all O in Q
Non-triviality Dominated gambles should not be chosen.
/∈C({ , }), /∈C({ , }), /∈C({ , })
∈ R({ , }), ∈ R({ , }), ∈ R({ , })
If f < g, then {g}=C({ f ,g})
Sen’s property α A rejected gamble should not be pro-
moted to a chosen gamble after adding gambles to the
option set.
∈ R({ , , }), ∈ R({ , , }), ∈ R({ , , })
If O1 ⊆ R(O2) and O2 ⊆ O3, then O1 ⊆ R(O3)
A variant of Aizerman’s condition A rejected gamble
should not be promoted to a chosen gamble after deleting
rejected gambles from the option set.
if { , } ⊆ R({ , , }), then ∈ R({ , })
If O2 ⊆ R(O3) and O1 ⊆ O2, then O2 \O1 ⊆ R(O3 \O1)
Convexity We introduce a new axiom: two gambles
should not be rejected from their convex hull.
not both ∈ R({ , , }) and ∈ R({ , , })
If O ⊆ CH({ f ,g}), then { f ,g}* R(O∪{ f ,g})
Scaling and independence
Scaling all gambles and adding
a single gamble is of no
importance:
C(λO+ { f}) = λC(O)+ { f}
for all λ in R>0 and f inL (X ).
a b c
0
X = {a,b,c}
= 32 , =
3
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C({ , }) =C({ , })
a b c
0
X = {a,b,c}
= + , = +
“Not more informative than” relation Given two choice
functions C1 and C2,
C1 is not more informative than C2⇔C1(O) ⊇C2(O)
for all O in Q. For a collection C of coherent choice func-
tions, its infimum is the coherent choice function given by
(infC)(O) =
⋃
C(O) for all O in Q.
ifC1({ , , , }) = { },C2({ , , , }) = { , },
then (inf{C1,C2})({ , , , }) = { , , }
Link with sets of desirable gambles Choice functions
are essentially non-pairwise comparisons of gambles.
Therefore, we can associated a single coherent set of desir-
able gambles with a coherent choice function C
DC = { f ∈L (X ) : 0 ∈ R({ f ,0})}.
Conversely, given a coherent set of desirable gambles D ,
there are multiple associated coherent choice functions,
and the least informative one is given by
CD(O) = { f ∈ O : (∀g ∈ O)g− f /∈ D} for all O in Q.
Inference Given a collection D of coherent sets of desir-
able gambles,
Dinf{CD ′ : D ′∈D} = infD. no loss of information
Given a collection C of coherent choice functions, for all O
in Q,
Cinf{DC′ : C′∈C}(O) ⊇ (infC)(O). loss of information
3. Choice functions
Choice functions are expressive enough to model the belief used in
the coin example. We start with Dv, and associate the choice function
Cv :=CDv with it:
Cv(O) = { f ∈ O : (∀g ∈ O) f 6< g} for all O in Q,
being the vacuous—or minimal informative—choice function.
We now work with DH and DT, and associate CH :=CDH and CT :=CDT.
CH(O) = argmax{ f (H) : f ∈ O}∩Cv(O) for all O in Q,
and analogous for CT.
The most informative choice function that is implied by CH and CT is Ccoin :=
inf{CH,CT}. We show that Ccoin 6=Cv.
H T
X = {H,T}
The vacuous choice function: Cv({ , , , }) = { , , }
The “coin” choice function: Ccoin({ , , , }) = { , }
Ccoin 6=Cv
With sets of desirable gambles, we are unable to express the difference
between the belief of the example and knowing nothing, whereas choice
functions are expressive enough to expose this difference.
4. Coin example with choice functions
If we want choice functions to be successful as a general tool to model
uncertainty, we need a good conditioning rule that coincides with
• the existing conditioning rule for sets of desirable gambles;
• Bayes’s rule for mass functions.
Some definitions With B⊆X , IB is the indicator of B.
With O in Q(L (B)), define
O↑ := { f ∈L (X ) : f IBc = 0 and (∃g ∈ O) f IB = gIB} ∈Q(L (X )).
a b c d e f
1
X = {a,b,c,d,e, f}, B= {a,b,d,e}
O = { , , , }
O↑= { , , , }
note that = IB
With O in Q(L (X )), define
O↓B :=
{
f ∈L (B) : (∃g ∈ O) f IB = gIB
} ∈Q(L (B)).
a b c d e f
1
X = {a,b,c,d,e, f}, B= {a,b,d,e}
O = { , , , }
O↓B = { , , , }
note that = 1
Conditioning rule We start with a coherent choice function C on
Q(L (X )), and we obtain the new information that B ⊆ X occurs.
Conditioning—or updating—is changing the belief model C according to
this new information:
C on Q(L (X )) CcB on Q(L (B))new information: B occurs
We propose the following conditioning rule:
CcB(O) :=C(O↑)↓B for all O in Q(L (B)).
Properties Given a coherent choice function C,
CcB is coherent⇔ B 6= /0.
For sets of desirable gambles, the conditioning rule leads to the usual condi-
tioning rule for sets of desirable gambles: given a coherent choice function C,
DCcB= { f ∈L (B) : f IB ∈DC},
meaning that our conditioning rule implies Bayes’s rule.
5. Conditioning with choice functions
